

Brief commentary on (draft): REPORT TO THE CITIZENS OF GAUTENG ON THE MIDTERM REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE: 2014 – Q2 2016/17

David Everatt

1. The Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG) has asked for a brief review of governance-related issues in the draft Mid-Term report of the current administration. Time constraints do not permit a detailed analysis, and this brief report may raise more questions than it can provide answers.
2. 'Governance' is often presented as normative and beyond the realm of politics, merely setting out 'how things should be'. At the descriptive level, this is acceptable, if one uses it to describe the

...processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organization or territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or language. (Bevir, 2015)
3. But even here it involves a judgement, by casting an eye over "the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions." (Hufty, 2011)
4. Governance, as used in this piece, seeks to understand where power is located in the system of government, how that power is used, and how to hold accountable those accessing power. Power and accountability are core to defining and assessing governance. The approach used here is based on a similar approach to that defined by GPG, namely that a ballot cast every 5 years is insufficient as a measure of governance: strong elements of 'public governance' are needed. This approach draws a distinction between organised politics – the driver for decision-making – and public administration, the processes by which services are delivered. The distinction is, admittedly, thin and contested – precisely because power and accountability are inherent in both.
5. The World Bank developed the language of 'good governance' – which shall not be used here – as an attempt to create a normative standard of how public institutions spend public money – primarily in developmental programmes, but concept creep has seen the language of 'good governance' become widespread. But while the Bank definition may (wittingly or not) downplay issues such as the role of the populace in setting budget priorities, or the role of residents more generally – and more regularly and pointedly than voting every 5 years – it is important to note the achievements made by this administration in the controlling of wastage, the transparency of tender appraisals, and positive trend regarding clean and unqualified audits, and the commitment to paying bills on time. In all these areas of 'good governance', Gauteng is either on a positive upwards trend, or is setting a trend (such as public tender

appraisal) that is both trend-setting and hopefully to be followed elsewhere.

6. The result of this very firm hand on the public purse has meant that in a time of global economic stagnation, Gauteng has continued to grow faster than the national economy, and has had resources available for development (through avoidance of wastage etc.) that deserve note. It is quite remarkable that in a time of economic stagnation and almost zero growth, Gauteng is making major strides in financial management, and ensuring that funds replace waste.

Silence

7. That said, however, the most glaring absence from the report is any mention whatsoever of the calamitous failure of governance at Life Esidimeni, and the death of 100 mental patients. The list of MECs has been adjusted to remove former health MEC Qedani Mahlangu and insert the name of her replacement, Dr Gwen Ramakgopa. But no mention is made of what occurred; how it occurred; how the system collapsed so tragically; nor subsequent actions by the GPG. This silence can be predicted to initiate outrage in some quarters. Government is strongly urged to state the facts as they are – given that this has already been made such a public issue – and be frank and honest with residents.
8. There is a further, governance-related point to make. In response to the tragedy, GPG approached the national Health Ombudsman (sic) to investigate the issue. At one level, this is commendable openness; and the resignation of the MEC – the first in democratic South Africa not preceded by a criminal conviction (such as John Block in the Northern Cape) – is commendable, if coloured by the tragedy that triggered it. The tragedy occurred, but in response the political head took responsibility and resigned, and the national ombudsman was asked to investigate the saga – in a report back to residents, this needs to be narrated. In particular, the reader will want to know what measures have been put in place to ensure there is never again a complete governance failure of this type or scale.
9. But for genuine transparency, the Ombudsman should be entirely independent – of government, of vested interests, and so on. However, he is not – he is appointed by the National Minister of Health. In the context of a divided and unstable politics, as well as a perceived tension between Gauteng and the national sphere, the whole saga seems to suggest that the governance machinery of government (from top to bottom) requires a review, to ensure that genuinely independent oversight is available in every sector. There are more lessons to learn here than merely patient (mis)management.
10. Even if GPG does not wish to engage this latter issue (of the Ombuds' independence) – and it would be tricky to do in the current context without sounding defensive – the silence on Life Esidimeni is likely to rebound on government: openness and transparency have marked the

handling of the issue to date, so why stop when it comes to the mid-term review?

Language

11. The report is entitled 'REPORT TO THE CITIZENS OF GAUTENG ON THE MIDTERM REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE'. At one level, this is merely a title, descriptive, and nothing controversial. However, the use of language demands care, especially when emanating from government.
12. Most research on xenophobia in South Africa to date (by individuals and projects such as the Southern African Migration Project) has shown that the use of 'citizen' is divisive, as are campaigns such as 'Proudly South African' and others. They promote – often subtly - a national chauvinism, even when that is not remotely their intention that feeds into a sense of South African exceptionalism. It also feeds notions of the 'non-citizen' as the 'other' and as inferior. If power is located anywhere, it is beyond the grasp of those who do not warrant inclusion as 'citizens'. Given that Gauteng has been the centre of xenophobic violence in 2008, 2015 and 2017, this is unfortunate.
13. Even more so is the lack of any real sense that GPG knows what to do about xenophobia – which broke out (again) in 2017 but (the violence) is not mentioned in the report. Why this second silence? Two major governance failures – Life Esidimeni and xenophobia – and yet the report says not a word about either. This brief overview is not trying to find silences in areas that may be seen to be politically sensitive, but if in tracing governance issues within the report it leads this author to absences and silences, it can be predicted that the same will be experienced by other readers, and by those who may wish to make political capital from these silences.
14. The best the mid-term review can offer is:

Support the work of the eminent persons group (social cohesion champions) that has been appointed to facilitate open and frank conversations on racism and xenophobia among various sectors of the population in Gauteng and to develop a provincial plan of action to combat racism and xenophobia. Furthermore:

 - a. *The Social Cohesion Champions are to work with the African Diaspora Forum to tackle incidences of crime, violence, xenophobia and vigilantism and protest action directed at migrants in townships in Gauteng.*
15. Xenophobic violence has been a hallmark of Gauteng since 2008. Racism and xenophobia have both been growing since before that date, and subsequently – though racism is not the same as xenophobia, and running them together (either as 'problem' or as subject to the same 'solution') is dangerous. Are we really still at the stage when our best response is an 'eminent persons' group' – who have yet to develop a provincial plan of

action – and hoping that (unnamed) ‘Champions’ may be able to put out fires?

16. Far more concrete action, with a far greater sense of urgency, is required. I return to this below, but eradicating xenophobia and beginning to try combat racism cannot be separated from the ‘nuts and bolts’ work of government. Providing a house, a title deed, running water or flushing toilet will not eradicate ‘othering’ by race or nationality – self-evidently a more integrated approach is needed. That in turn requires GPG to inject far greater urgency into both these ‘wicked’ issues – racism and xenophobia – precisely because they have the power to undo and destroy the work done in, say, providing services or delivering infrastructure; and most certainly damage Gauteng’s claim to be the gateway to Africa and an Afropolitan city-region.
17. Beginning with GPG, in the MTR, ‘watching your language’ would at least be a start. *Citizens* may vote – but residents (wherever they are from) live, work, and pay taxes in Gauteng. The use of ‘citizen’ throughout the report implies a hierarchy, where non-citizens are lower on the scale than citizens. Surely this report is for residents, and not an exclusive, ‘citizen’-only output? A small step, perhaps, but that is how long journeys begin.

Measurement confusion?

18. At one level, the report is a collation of some quite remarkable – and some less remarkable – figures. The provincial government elected in 2014 is indeed restless to tackle some of post-apartheid’s biggest problems, at the heart of which lie ‘soft’ issues such as overhauling the education system, and ‘hard’ issues such as seeking creative ways of overcoming the spatial differentiation literally built into the fabric of the province. But restlessness should not be allowed to lead to a multitude of unlinked activities.
19. On page 158, the report finally makes mention of GPG’s theory of change – or, put simply, how all its activities are meant to link up together to attain a desired set of outcomes, which are then measured against intentions.

Theory of Change is essentially a comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It is focused in particular on mapping out or “filling in” what has been described as the “missing middle” between what a program or change initiative does (its activities or interventions) and how these lead to desired goals being achieved. It does this by first identifying the desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that must be in place (and how these related to one another causally) for the goals to occur.

20. At a political level, it can be argued that the Premier’s speech after taking up his position, and his ten point plan, read with the National Development Plan (NDP), should suffice. But they do not – they are a

statement of desired long-term goals – they do not explain how to attain those goals, step by step and programme by programme. Some may be fairly rapidly attained, while others, such as undoing the spatial inequalities of apartheid, are clearly long-term projects. The scores and scores of projects (some tiny in scale, at other times massive) suggests that GPG runs the risk of ‘development by piggeries’, as a cynical treasury official in the mid-1990s commented on the challenge of trying to meet all needs in one way or another, but rarely (if ever) by integration arising from genuine co-ordination. A project here and a project there will not amount to any sort of transformation.

21. It is strongly urged that the theory of change be surfaced and made explicit in this report. Much of what is written here reflects the seeming fragmentation of government work into multiple ‘bite-sized chunks’ – see the appendices to this report, which list (merely through a cut and paste function) the 35 strategies and 25 frameworks active in government and mentioned in the report. How – if at all – do they link to one another, and support across sectors? How will government avoid duplication and overlap, and not waste money on countless consultants to design, cost and package all these interventions? None of that is made clear to the reader.

Scatter-gun & fragmentation?

22. It is difficult to avoid the impression of a scatter-gun approach when reading this document. In addition to the 35 strategies and 25 frameworks, the report also describes and collates results for 58 programmes. These range from working with 3 farmers to providing thousands of young women with sanitary packs to hundreds of thousands of work and/or training opportunities created. What the report does not tell us is how these programmes are mutually reinforcing, are responsive to participants’ needs (governance is about allowing citizens to influence action by releasing the grip on power) and by integrating complexity – mixing together bricks & mortar programmes (or frameworks or strategies) with psycho-social messages and campaigns (and frameworks, strategies and the like).
23. At the risk of vast over-simplification, GPG needs to a theory of change to:
- Identify long-term goals (the 10 point programme, NDP, manifesto)
 - Mapping and connecting outcomes (integrating designs)
 - Develop an outcomes framework (how to measure)
 - Identifying assumptions (important for cross-departmental work)
 - Develop indicators (what to measure)
 - Identify interventions (designing programmes to meet the above)
24. This may well have occurred – but none of it is made clear to the reader.
25. A clear GPG-wide Theory of Change would state, up front, how government inevitably has to work across multiple sectors, but guided by

the 10-point programme, it has designed frameworks with *linked* goals and strategies, that are *co-ordinated* in their design and above all at the *point of implementation*, in order to support one another (and avoid wasteful duplication) in pursuit of over-arching provincial goals. They should be assessed against realistic, achievable, and measurable indicators, including those that point to successes that may only occur many years from now.

26. Above all, this would allow the MTR review to say (albeit a simplistic reduction here) 'we have achieved X against our stated goal of Y' – as a government - which would be far more valuable to readers than the current list of (presumably) every programme, framework, policy and intervention, with numbers attached. That government is saving money, improving internal performance and running a tight ship is clear from the MTR; but what is less clear, is what do all the externalities add up to? How much of a dent are we making in poverty, food insecurity, inequality, racism, township economic stagnation, and so on? Do the programmes have both internal and transversal logic? If not, we are firing good intentions at problems.
27. Success or failure is impossible to deduce from a list – it requires a *judgement*; and to judge success or failure, we need to know what the goal was; how we planned to reach it; what got in our way (such as faulty internal assumptions, or external shocks); and how we plan to get back on track/speed up progress/etc. Perhaps this is unfair – but the multiple frameworks, programmes, strategies, task teams and the like have all, been at work converting into programmatic intervention the promises of politicians, summarised at the outset:

Themed on creating a better life for all and a pledge to move South Africa forward together, the electoral mandate directed government to build on the successes and tackle the challenges of the first twenty years of democracy since 1994. The imperative was to carry forward the progress made in implementing the 2009 manifesto priorities: the creation of more jobs, decent work and sustainable livelihoods for inclusive growth; rural development, land reform and food security; improving education and health systems and outcomes; and fighting crime and corruption.

The 2014 election mandate further prioritised and made a commitment to:

The expansion of access to housing and basic services as part of the commitment to build integrated and sustainable human settlements;

Build a democratic developmental state capable of mobilising all sectors and boldly intervening in the economy in favour of workers and the poor; and

Working with all sectors of society to create conditions for the promotion of social cohesion and nation building and contribute to a better Africa and a just world.

In giving effect to the electoral mandate and the National Development Plan (NDP), the Premier announced a comprehensive programme of radical socio-economic transformation for the Gauteng City Region – the Ten Pillar Programme of Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation (TMR). The TMR programme was pronounced in the Premier's first State of the Province Address on 27 June 2014 and consisted of the following ten strategic pillars:

Radical economic transformation

Decisive spatial transformation

Accelerated social transformation

Transformation of state and governance

Modernisation of the public service

Modernisation of the economy

Modernisation of human settlements and urban development

Modernisation of public transport infrastructure

Reindustrialisation of Gauteng Province

Taking the lead in Africa's new industrial revolution.

28. This preamble suggests that the reader will find a merging of the NDP with the 10 pillars of the Premier, broken down into measurable actions, those transformed into programmes of size allowed by the fiscus, located in departments but co-ordinated by the planning unit, and wherever possible, implemented together. If we want 'Radical economic transformation', for example, do we believe this is possible without *simultaneously* pursuing 'Accelerated social transformation' – not in parallel but in the design of programmes, and at the same points of implementation? A skills training programme that does not embed messages about equality, anti-xenophobia, anti-racism, pro-gender equality and the like is going to do absolutely nothing to assist with these 'wicked' issues that continue to bedevil the province. The programme will produce graduates who leave with some skills but with as prejudiced and/or alienated world views as they entered the programme.
29. The danger is a continual focus on provision of basic services and infrastructure, in the hope that this will 'take care' of more complex societal challenges. The basis of the 1994 *Reconstruction and Development Programme* (RDP) was just that:- a hope that if basic needs were met, then 'dignity' (so violently wrenched from African, coloured and Indian people) would be restored – with no clarity (or theory of change) as to *how* this was supposed to happen. All research since then suggests that this signally fails to occur (see for example every iteration of the GCRO 'Quality of Life' survey).
30. Ignoring all the global post-1994 challenges – economic crises, wars (on terror or other), and so on – if we focus simply on domestic matters, we have yet to see any government (in any sphere or from any party) outline a genuine post-apartheid theory of change, that can encompass the unquestioned need to meet basic needs *and* to deal decisively and *simultaneously* with psycho-social issues; and, crucially, signal what might

be taken to measure 'normality' – the end of transformation and transition and all the interim language that marks government documents, including this one. If we can't measure what we're doing and *why* we are doing it; we then do not know what all the small actions add up to; and we will not be able to see above the concatenation of small programme reports to understand progress towards the attainment of a democratic, non-sexist and non-racial South Africa.

31. The RDP was facing massive expectations and massive inequalities. It had to pick the low-hanging fruit, and in Gauteng this has been massively successful, as the MTR makes clear. But this current Gauteng administration is not facing the bleak landscape of 1994. The opening section of the report shows how successfully 'development' has occurred in the province. As such, it must fall to Gauteng to insist (to itself) that *integration* is the only way that future programmes can operate: in other words, not to wait for development – in the form of service delivery or infrastructure provision - to 'happen' before worrying about psycho-social issues, but integrating positive psycho-social messages and 'soft' programmes within the 'bricks and mortar' programmes that will continue to roll out.
32. Rape, homophobia, xenophobia, racism, violence, criminality, substance abuse – these and other psycho-social challenges can be integrated within job creation or farming extension or skills training or other programmes, with the right design and the right partnerships. But if government remains mired in silos, with multiple frameworks and programmes running out of different departments, without an integrating mechanism beyond a planning department that sits in the Office of the Premier while programmes report to MECs – we shall continue with bricks and mortar programmes, but remain surprised when those bricks are thrown at police during protests by residents whose psychological needs remain unmet.

Governmentality

33. But rather like the silence regarding action against xenophobia, the silence regarding GPG's theory of change is of concern. Seen from a governance perspective, the question is – do you know where you are on the journey to where you are going? The obvious danger facing GPG – from a cynical reading of this MTR – is that government is doing what it does best, namely allowing a proliferation of internal activities at the expense of the populace – the exact opposite of what an 'activist government' would want to occur.
34. But the reader of this document is drowned in acronyms, programmes, frameworks, policies, committees and so on, most of which would have included a panel of experts, consultants, policy advisors, M&E experts, financial planners and the like – and the cartoon from the *New Yorker* elegantly captures the feelings of most citizens onwards such activities, and the costs associated with them.



"Thank God! A panel of experts!"

35. In addition, from a governance perspective, a legitimate question is: when, if at all, were residents treated as insiders, and asked to reflect on the value and costs associated with GPG's multifarious programmes? Governance is about the location of power in society, and the accountability of those who can wield power. Does GPG have the appropriate apparatus to reach out to citizens and allow a meaningful engagement – we know that IDP and similar fora are not attracting residents, and those who do attend seem to have very low expectations of being heard. But in a democracy, *voice* is important – so an outsider's question is, at what point did the voice of Gauteng residents get heard (post election day), and with what effect?

Can an activist government cope with an activist citizenry?

36. As we approach the conclusion, it is important to highlight in this report what is not highlighted in the MTR, but which provides continual 'background noise' – namely, the distance between the 'activist government' and the governed. 'Protest' is mentioned ten times in the report, along with positive mentions of a 'war room' to try and deal with it, but also an ominous look at the rise in scale and violence:

The period 2012 to 2016 has then seen an escalation in the both the number and scale of protests, peaking at 40 protests in 2014, before subsiding to 25 in 2015, but increasing again to 24 in the period to July 2016. Particularly concerning is the increasingly violent nature of the protests

37. The report nods in the direction of engaging citizens, though unfortunately cloaked in the language of ‘war rooms’ and the like, perhaps an inappropriate appellation for an office dealing with violent protest:

... this programme outcome seeks to enhance the GPG as an activist government, and to institutionalise rapid response to community concerns and proactive engagement with communities at all levels. This will be achieved through mainstreaming the Ntirhisano Service Delivery Rapid Response System, the hotlines and the Service Delivery War Room, and integrating the work of Community Development Worker’s, thus curtailing the escalation of community concerns into violent protests.

38. Rather late than never – we have been witnesses to xenophobic violence, for example, for almost a decade; and to more generalised violence for a lot longer, but the text is written in the future tense, of an intention rather than an already completed action. Why such a ‘war room’ (which aims at bringing about peace....) was not created on day one is a not unreasonable question. But there is a deeper issue at stake.
39. Gauteng has become a centre for civic protest. We know the label ‘service delivery protest’ obscures more than it reveals, and there are competing political, criminal and civic interests at play. Nonetheless, protest is the sign of an engaged citizenry, one that has learned that “protest is the quickest petition” (Everatt, Marais, Dube: ‘Participation – for what purpose?’ in *Politikon*). Is a ‘war’ room the appropriate response – even the language implies a taking of sides, an oppositionality, where in fact we are witnessing activist government meeting activist communities. How government manages protest will be a key litmus test of its commitment to being activist. And allowing *voice* to those who feel side-lined or ignored will be key in doing so.
40. A key issue GPG needs to look at is that of participatory governance. The globally well-known sub-national level examples – such as Porto Allegre or Kerala – are based on government releasing the levers of power sufficiently for local residents to determine the ranking of issues to be tackled, and the budgetary proportions to be set against each key area. The basic idea is that residents should play a more direct role in decision-making and government officials should be confident enough to allow and respond to this kind of engagement. Izimbizo were a weak attempt to follow suit, but would often result in promises made to those who attended – a school here, a road there – but these would cause envy amongst residents who had not been heard, or not attended. The public service, naturally risk averse, has become even more so over time. Access to power is more distant, for citizens, than it has ever been.

Conclusion

41. It seems apparent that if Gauteng is to break the bitter cycle of successful delivery of infrastructure of services being met with rising levels of protest, xenophobia and crime, it needs a machinery of engagement. It

needs to be an activist government that embraces other activists, that can listen and ensure they have *voice*, that it is nimble and can change in mid-programme if it seems to be going awry – because it knows what each programme contributes to the theory of change. Above all, GPG needs to loosen the constraints on and concentration of power. If GPG trusts the residents it governs, it needs to find ways of allowing our voices to influence how GPG plans, executes and measures its work, and how it reports to us.

42. For this to work efficiently, as argued above, government needs to know what it is trying to do before it leaps into the fray. There is a completely understandable desire for ‘quick wins’, for increasingly dubious voters to be shown that government can work for them. However, diving into ‘deliverology’ without an adequately developed theory of change will mean more of the same – and that will not suffice. A mid-term report-back – to residents – needs to tell us what GPG is trying to do; how it is trying to do so; via which, interrelated vehicles (frameworks, programmes, etc.); and with what results. Merely listing numbers of participants does not tell us anything of substance. Listing frameworks and strategies makes us anxious that government is feeding the machinery of government – all the consultants, advisors and other hangers on – but is a closed door when it comes to residents’ attempts to give voice to their own needs and desires.
43. This is an easy criticism to make, and one that can be levelled against most governments at most times. But for a self-proclaimed ‘activist government’ it is inappropriate. GPG needs to find a way to close the gap between government and governed. It is in a strong position, as the opening, descriptive section of the report makes clear – it has done more than any other provincial government to make good on the promises of the RDP.
44. However, where the NDP talks of ‘the active citizen’, GPG seems not to have a clear strategy for engagement, for listening, and for trusting – for releasing some of its grip on power and allowing residents to influence priorities, programmes and budgets. Until we take this step, residents will see themselves on one ‘side’ with government on the other; governance will be the victim.

Sample list of strategies cited in MTR

1. the Accelerated Social Transformation Strategy
2. the Governance and Planning Roadmap
3. a GCR-wide human resources development strategy
4. the Agro-Processing Strategy,
5. the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Plan (GFIP) strategy,
6. the Gauteng Township Economy Revitalisation (TER) Strategy
7. The Gauteng Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (GIBUS)
8. The Gauteng Resourcing Strategy
9. The Gauteng Procurement Strategy
10. the Gauteng Integrated Energy Strategy (GIES, 2010) has renamed “the Gauteng Energy Security Strategy (GESS)”
11. the Gauteng Tourism Sector Strategy
12. the Mineral Beneficiation Sector Strategy
13. the Gauteng Aquaculture strategy
14. the Agro-Processing Strategy
15. the Provincial Transport Strategy
16. the Gauteng Trade and Investment Strategy
17. the GCR International Relations Strategy
18. The Gauteng Trade and Investment Strategy
19. the GCR International Relations Strategy
20. GDE E-learning strategy
21. the Gauteng Safety Strategy
22. Agritropolis strategy
23. Government Debt strategy
24. Gauteng Resourcing Strategy
25. Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework
26. the Gauteng Anti-Corruption and Integrity Management Strategy
27. a climate-smart agriculture strategy
28. the Gauteng Agriculture and Agro-processing Strategy
29. the societal behaviour change strategy
30. the provincial social cohesion strategy
31. the Gauteng Climate Change Strategy (GCCRS) and Action Plan
32. a Gauteng City-Region Climate Change Response Overarching Strategy
33. the GCR-wide Disaster Management Strategy
34. the Township Economic Revitalisation Strategy
35. the Accelerated Social Transformation Strategy

Sample list of frameworks cited in MTR

1. The Township Stock Exchange (TSE) framework
2. The Township Solidarity / Partnership Fund framework
3. the GCR Job Creation Framework / Plan
4. the legal framework agreement for Solar PV
5. for the GCR Incentives Framework
6. the draft Gauteng Incentives Framework
7. The GCR Infrastructure Master Plan,
8. the Gauteng Spatial Development Framework
9. the SPLUMA implementation Plan
10. Gauteng Environmental Management Framework (EMF) approved, as well as the Gauteng Green House Gas Inventory (GHG) developed.
11. The Gauteng Environmental Management Framework
12. Gauteng Environmental Management Framework (EMF)
13. the Gauteng Green House Gas Inventory (GHG).
14. the Vaal River City Implementation Framework
15. the Regional Spatial Development Framework for Lanseria node
16. The draft IGR policy framework
17. the revised Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework
18. the Integrity Management Framework
19. an improved Disclosure Framework
20. a Contract Management Framework
21. the gender, youth, disability, military veterans and older persons (GEYODI&MVO) policy framework
22. the Land Invasion Framework
23. a coherent GCR governance and institutional framework
24. the Theory of Change and Results Chain Framework
25. the Gauteng IDP Analysis Framework

Sample list of programmes cited in MTR

Through 2014/15 as a transition year, focus was placed on the development of new sectoral policies, as well as the translation of the TMR into measurable programmes and targets to enable higher order results and transformative impacts.

1. the Ntirhisano Service Delivery War Room and Outreach Programme
2. a comprehensive programme of radical socio-economic transformation for the Gauteng City Region – the Ten Pillar Programme of Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation (TMR).
3. the antiretroviral treatment programme
4. the Gauteng Frontline Service Delivery Monitoring (FSDM) programme
5. the Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation programme.
6. the War on Poverty Programme
7. the Welfare to Work Programme
8. Game Changer programme (never defined)
9. tourism skills development programmes.
10. the Tshepo 500 000 Programme
11. EPWP programmes
12. the TIH Fablab programme
13. youth education programmes at the Constitution Hill
14. ECD massification programme
15. the comprehensive school nutrition programme
16. The Bana-Pele programme
17. food production programme
18. a variety of skills development programmes
19. The Ke Moja Drug Prevention Programme
20. the Ntirhisano Community Outreach Programme
21. The Township Economy Revitalisation Programme
22. the Professional Development Programme
23. the tourism market access programme
24. The Responsible Tourism pilot programme
25. the Gauteng Accelerator Programme
26. the Maxum incubation programme
27. the jewellery making programme
28. DRT's contractor development programme
29. the National Youth Service (NYS) Programme
30. the Zivuseni Reloaded Programme
31. the market access programme
32. the Letsema programme
33. the veterinary and livestock production mentoring programme
34. the eKasi Labs Programme
35. the PRASA Corridor Modernisation Programme
36. The Shova Kalula programme, as a subset of the NMT project (3000 bicycles)
37. the export promotion programme/the Africa focussed market access programme
38. the school twinning programme
39. the Schools of Specialisation programme
40. programmes on TB screening
41. the Healthy Wednesdays programme
42. The WBOT programme
43. homestead food gardens programmes
44. a skills training programme
45. The Take Charge outreach programme
46. youth safety promotion programmes
47. the integrated substance abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation model
48. the Ke-Moja Drug Prevention programme

49. the Mega Projects programme/ the Mega Human Settlements programme
50. Back to Basics (B2B) Programme
51. the Klijptown and Alexandra urban revitalisation programmes
52. revenue enhancement programme
53. the Integrity Management Framework and programme
54. the eradication of poverty and urban hunger programme
55. the infrastructure development and maintenance programme
56. the Social Movement Programme
57. the CRU Programme
58. the urban regeneration programme