1	Brief commentary on (draft): REPORT TO THE CITIZENS OF GAUTENG ON THE MIDTERM REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE: 2014 – Q2 2016/17  David Everatt ________________________________________________________________________  1. The	Gauteng	Provincial	Government	(GPG)	has	asked	for	a	brief	review	of	governance-related	issues	in	the	draft	Mid-Term	report	of	the	current	administration.	Time	constraints	do	not	permit	a	detailed	analysis,	and	this	brief	report	may	raise	more	questions	than	it	can	provide	answers.		2. ‘Governance’	is	often	presented	as	normative	and	beyond	the	realm	of	politics,	merely	setting	out	‘how	things	should	be’.	At	the	descriptive	level,	this	is	acceptable,	if	one	uses	it	to	describe	the			…processes	of	governing,	whether	undertaken	by	a	government,	market	or	network,	whether	over	a	family,	tribe,	formal	or	informal	organization	or	territory	and	whether	through	the	laws,	norms,	power	or	language.	(Bevir,	2015)			3. But	even	here	it	involves	a	judgement,	by	casting	an	eye	over	"the	processes	of	interaction	and	decision-making	among	the	actors	involved	in	a	collective	problem	that	lead	to	the	creation,	reinforcement,	or	reproduction	of	social	norms	and	institutions.”	(Hufty,	2011)			4. Governance,	as	used	in	this	piece,	seeks	to	understand	where	power	is	located	in	the	system	of	government,	how	that	power	is	used,	and	how	to	hold	accountable	those	accessing	power.	Power	and	accountability	are	core	to	defining	and	assessing	governance.	The	approach	used	here	is	based	on	a	similar	approach	to	that	defined	by	GPG,	namely	that	a	ballot	cast	every	5	years	is	insufficient	as	a	measure	of	governance:	strong	elements	of	‘public	governance’	are	needed.	This	approach	draws	a	distinction	between	organised	politics	–	the	driver	for	decision-making	–	and	public	administration,	the	processes	by	which	services	are	delivered.	The	distinction	is,	admittedly,	thin	and	contested	–	precisely	because	power	and	accountability	are	inherent	in	both.		5. The	World	Bank	developed	the	language	of	‘good	governance’	–	which	shall	not	be	used	here	–	as	an	attempt	to	create	a	normative	standard	of	how	public	institutions	spend	public	money	–	primarily	in	developmental	programmes,	but	concept	creep	has	seen	the	language	of	‘good	governance’	become	widespread.	But	while	the	Bank	definition	may	(wittingly	or	not)	downplay	issues	such	as	the	role	of	the	populace	in	setting	budget	priorities,	or	the	role	of	residents	more	generally	–	and	more	regularly	and	pointedly	than	voting	every	5	years	–	it	is	important	to	note	the	achievements	made	by	this	administration	in	the	controlling	of	wastage,	the	transparency	of	tender	appraisals,	and	positive	trend	regarding	clean	and	unqualified	audits,	and	the	commitment	to	paying	bills	on	time.	In	all	these	areas	of	‘good	governance’,	Gauteng	is	either	on	a	positive	upwards	trend,	or	is	setting	a	trend	(such	as	public	tender

2	appraisal)	that	is	both	trend-setting	and	hopefully	to	be	followed	elsewhere.		6. The	result	of	this	very	firm	hand	on	the	public	purse	has	meant	that	in	a	time	of	global	economic	stagnation,	Gauteng	has	continued	to	grow	faster	than	the	national	economy,	and	has	had	resources	available	for	development	(through	avoidance	of	wastage	etc.)	that	deserve	note.	It	is	quite	remarkable	that	in	a	time	of	economic	stagnation	and	almost	zero	growth,	Gauteng	is	making	major	strides	in	financial	management,	and	ensuring	that	funds	replace	waste.		Silence 7. That	said,	however,	the	most	glaring	absence	from	the	report	is	any	mention	whatsoever	of	the	calamitous	failure	of	governance	at	Life	Esidimeni,	and	the	death	of	100	mental	patients.	The	list	of	MECs	has	been	adjusted	to	remove	former	health	MEC	Qedani	Mahlangu	and	insert	the	name	of	her	replacement,	Dr	Gwen	Ramakgopa.	But	no	mention	is	made	of	what	occurred;	how	it	occurred;	how	the	system	collapsed	so	tragically;	nor	subsequent	actions	by	the	GPG.	This	silence	can	be	predicted	to	initiate	outrage	in	some	quarters.	Government	is	strongly	urged	to	state	the	facts	as	they	are	–	given	that	this	has	already	been	made	such	a	public	issue	–	and	be	frank	and	honest	with	residents.		8. There	is	a	further,	governance-related	point	to	make.	In	response	to	the	tragedy,	GPG	approached	the	national	Health	Ombudsman	(sic)	to	investigate	the	issue.	At	one	level,	this	is	commendable	openness;	and	the	resignation	of	the	MEC	–	the	first	in	democratic	South	Africa	not	preceded	by	a	criminal	conviction	(such	as	John	Block	in	the	Northern	Cape)	–	is	commendable,	if	coloured	by	the	tragedy	that	triggered	it.	The	tragedy	occurred,	but	in	response	the	political	head	took	responsibility	and	resigned,	and	the	national	ombudsman	was	asked	to	investigate	the	saga	–	in	a	report	back	to	residents,	this	needs	to	be	narrated.	In	particular,	the	reader	will	want	to	know	what	measures	have	been	put	in	place	to	ensure	there	is	never	again	a	complete	governance	failure	of	this	type	or	scale.			9. But	for	genuine	transparency,	the	Ombudsman	should	be	entirely	independent	–	of	government,	of	vested	interests,	and	so	on.	However,	he	is	not	–	he	is	appointed	by	the	National	Minister	of	Health.	In	the	context	of	a	divided	and	unstable	politics,	as	well	as	a	perceived	tension	between	Gauteng	and	the	national	sphere,	the	whole	saga	seems	to	suggest	that	the	governance	machinery	of	government	(from	top	to	bottom)	requires	a	review,	to	ensure	that	genuinely	independent	oversight	is	available	in	every	sector.	There	are	more	lessons	to	learn	here	than	merely	patient	(mis)management.		10. Even	if	GPG	does	not	wish	to	engage	this	latter	issue	(of	the	Ombuds’	independence)	–	and	it	would	be	tricky	to	do	in	the	current	context	without	sounding	defensive	–	the	silence	on	Life	Esidimeni	is	likely	to	rebound	on	government:	openness	and	transparency	have	marked	the

3	handling	of	the	issue	to	date,	so	why	stop	when	it	comes	to	the	mid-term	review?		Language  11. The	report	is	entitled	‘REPORT	TO	THE	CITIZENS	OF	GAUTENG	ON	THE	MIDTERM	REVIEW	OF	PERFORMANCE’.	At	one	level,	this	is	merely	a	title,	descriptive,	and	nothing	controversial.	However,	the	use	of	language	demands	care,	especially	when	emanating	from	government.			12. Most	research	on	xenophobia	in	South	Africa	to	date	(by	individuals	and	projects	such	as	the	Southern	African	Migration	Project)	has	shown	that	the	use	of	‘citizen’	is	divisive,	as	are	campaigns	such	as	‘Proudly	South	African’	and	others.	They	promote	–	often	subtly	-	a	national	chauvinism,	even	when	that	is	not	remotely	their	intention	that	feeds	into	a	sense	of	South	African	exceptionalism.	It	also	feeds	notions	of	the	‘non-citizen’	as	the	‘other’	and	as	inferior.	If	power	is	located	anywhere,	it	is	beyond	the	grasp	of	those	who	do	not	warrant	inclusion	as	‘citizens’.	Given	that	Gauteng	has	been	the	centre	of	xenophobic	violence	in	2008,	2015	and	2017,	this	is	unfortunate.		13. Even	more	so	is	the	lack	of	any	real	sense	that	GPG	knows	what	to	do	about	xenophobia	–	which	broke	out	(again)	in	2017	but	(the	violence)	is	not	mentioned	in	the	report.	Why	this	second	silence?	Two	major	governance	failures	–	Life	Esidimeni	and	xenophobia	–	and	yet	the	report	says	not	a	word	about	either.	This	brief	overview	is	not	trying	to	find	silences	in	areas	that	may	be	seen	to	be	politically	sensitive,	but	if	in	tracing	governance	issues	within	the	report	it	leads	this	author	to	absences	and	silences,	it	can	be	predicted	that	the	same	will	be	experienced	by	other	readers,	and	by	those	who	may	wish	to	make	political	capital	from	these	silences.			14. The	best	the	mid-term	review	can	offer	is:		Support  the  work  of  the  eminent  persons  group  (social  cohesion  champions) that  has  been  appointed  to  facilitate  open  and  frank conversations  on  racism and  xenophobia  among  various  sectors  of  the  population  in  Gauteng  and  to develop  a  provincial  plan  of  action  to  combat  racism  and  xenophobia. Furthermore: a. The  Social  Cohesion  Champions  are  to  work  with  the  African Diaspora  Forum  to  tackle  incidences  of  crime,  violence,  xenophobia and vigilantism and protest action directed at migrants in townships in Gauteng. 15. Xenophobic	violence	has	been	a	hallmark	of	Gauteng	since	2008.	Racism	and	xenophobia	have	both	been	growing	since	before	that	date,	and	subsequently	–	though	racism	is	not	the	same	as	xenophobia,	and	running	them	together	(either	as	‘problem’	or	as	subject	to	the	same	‘solution’)	is	dangerous.	Are	we	really	still	at	the	stage	when	our	best	response	is	an	‘eminent	persons’	group’	–	who	have	yet	to	develop	a	provincial	plan	of

4	action	–	and	hoping	that	(unnamed)	‘Champions’	may	be	able	to	put	out	fires?			16. Far	more	concrete	action,	with	a	far	greater	sense	of	urgency,	is	required.	I	return	to	this	below,	but	eradicating	xenophobia	and	beginning	to	try	combat	racism	cannot	be	separated	from	the	‘nuts	and	bolts’	work	of	government.	Providing	a	house,	a	title	deed,	running	water	or	flushing	toilet	will	not	eradicate	‘othering’	by	race	or	nationality	–	self-evidently	a	more	integrated	approach	is	needed.	That	in	turn	requires	GPG	to	inject	far	greater	urgency	into	both	these	‘wicked’	issues	–	racism	and	xenophobia	–	precisely	because	they	have	the	power	to	undo	and	destroy	the	work	done	in,	say,	providing	services	or	delivering	infrastructure;	and	most	certainly	damage	Gauteng’s	claim	to	be	the	gateway	to	Africa	and	an	Afropolitan	city-region.		17. Beginning	with	GPG,	in	the	MTR,	‘watching	your	language’	would	at	least	be	a	start.	Citizens	may	vote	–	but	residents	(wherever	they	are	from)	live,	work,	and	pay	taxes	in	Gauteng.	The	use	of	‘citizen’	throughout	the	report	implies	a	hierarchy,	where	non-citizens	are	lower	on	the	scale	than	citizens.	Surely	this	report	is	for	residents,	and	not	an	exclusive,	‘citizen’-only	output?	A	small	step,	perhaps,	but	that	is	how	long	journeys	begin.		Measurement confusion? 18. At	one	level,	the	report	is	a	collation	of	some	quite	remarkable	–	and	some	less	remarkable	–	figures.	The	provincial	government	elected	in	2014	is	indeed	restless	to	tackle	some	of	post-apartheid’s	biggest	problems,	at	the	heart	of	which	lie	‘soft’	issues	such	as	overhauling	the	education	system,	and	‘hard’	issues	such	as	seeking	creative	ways	of	overcoming	the	spatial	differentiation	literally	built	into	the	fabric	of	the	province.	But	restlessness	should	not	be	allowed	to	lead	to	a	multitude	of	unlinked	activities.		19. On	page	158,	the	report	finally	makes	mention	of	GPG’s	theory	of	change	–	or,	put	simply,	how	all	its	activities	are	meant	to	link	up	together	to	attain	a	desired	set	of	outcomes,	which	are	then	measured	against	intentions.			Theory  of  Change  is  essentially  a  comprehensive  description  and  illustration of  how  and  why  a  desired  change  is  expected  to  happen  in  a  particular context. It is focused in particular on mapping out or “filling in” what has been described  as  the  “missing  middle”  between  what  a  program  or  change initiative  does  (its  activities  or  interventions)  and  how  these  lead  to  desired goals  being  achieved.  It  does  this  by  first  identifying  the  desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that  must  be  in  place  (and  how  these  related  to  one  another  causally)  for  the goals to occur. 20. At	a	political	level,	it	can	be	argued	that	the	Premier’s	speech	after	taking	up	his	position,	and	his	ten	point	plan,	read	with	the	National	Development	Plan	(NDP),	should	suffice.	But	they	do	not	–	they	are	a

5	statement	of	desired	long-term	goals	–	they	do	not	explain	how	to	attain	those	goals,	step	by	step	and	programme	by	programme.	Some	may	be	fairly	rapidly	attained,	while	others,	such	as	undoing	the	spatial	inequalities	of	apartheid,	are	clearly	long-term	projects.	The	scores	and	scores	of	projects	(some	tiny	in	scale,	at	other	times	massive)	suggests	that	GPG	runs	the	risk	of	‘development	by	piggeries’,	as	a	cynical	treasury	official	in	the	mid-1990s	commented	on	the	challenge	of	trying	to	meet	all	needs	in	one	way	or	another,	but	rarely	(if	ever)	by	integration	arising	from	genuine	co-ordination.	A	project	here	and	a	project	there	will	not	amount	to	any	sort	of	transformation.		21. It	is	strongly	urged	that	the	theory	of	change	be	surfaced	and	made	explicit	in	this	report.	Much	of	what	is	written	here	reflects	the	seeming	fragmentation	of	government	work	into	multiple	‘bite-sized	chunks’	–	see	the	appendices	to	this	report,	which	list	(merely	through	a	cut	and	paste	function)	the	35	strategies	and	25	frameworks	active	in	government	and	mentioned	in	the	report.	How	–	if	at	all	–	do	they	link	to	one	another,	and	support	across	sectors?	How	will	government	avoid	duplication	and	overlap,	and	not	waste	money	on	countless	consultants	to	design,	cost	and	package	all	these	interventions?	None	of	that	is	made	clear	to	the	reader.	 Scatter-gun & fragmentation? 22. It	is	difficult	to	avoid	the	impression	of	a	scatter-gun	approach	when	reading	this	document.	In	addition	to	the	35	strategies	and	25	frameworks,	the	report	also	describes	and	collates	results	for	58	programmes.	These	range	from	working	with	3	farmers	to	providing	thousands	of	young	women	with	sanitary	packs	to	hundreds	of	thousands	of	work	and/or	training	opportunities	created.	What	the	report	does	not	tell	us	is	how	these	programmes	are	mutually	reinforcing,	are	responsive	to	participants’	needs	(governance	is	about	allowing	citizens	to	influence	action	by	releasing	the	grip	on	power)	and	by	integrating	complexity	–	mixing	together	bricks	&	mortar	programmes	(or	frameworks	or	strategies)	with	psycho-social	messages	and	campaigns	(and	frameworks,	strategies	and	the	like).			23. At	the	risk	of	vast	over-simplification,	GPG	needs	to	a	theory	of	change	to:		• Identify	long-term	goals	(the	10	point	programme,	NDP,	manifesto)	• Mapping	and	connecting	outcomes	(integrating	designs)	• Develop	an	outcomes	framework	(how	to	measure)	• Identifying	assumptions	(important	for	cross-departmental	work)	• Develop	indicators	(what	to	measure)	• Identify	interventions	(designing	programmes	to	meet	the	above)		24. This	may	well	have	occurred	–	but	none	of	it	is	made	clear	to	the	reader.			25. A	clear	GPG-wide	Theory	of	Change	would	state,	up	front,	how	government	inevitably	has	to	work	across	multiple	sectors,	but	guided	by

6	the	10-point	programme,	it	has	designed	frameworks	with	linked	goals	and	strategies,	that	are	co-ordinated	in	their	design	and	above	all	at	the	point	of	implementation,	in	order	to	support	one	another	(and	avoid	wasteful	duplication)	in	pursuit	of	over-arching	provincial	goals.	They	should	be	assessed	against	realistic,	achievable,	and	measurable	indicators,	including	those	that	point	to	successes	that	may	only	occur	many	years	from	now.		26. Above	all,	this	would	allow	the	MTR	review	to	say	(albeit	a	simplistic	reduction	here)	‘we	have	achieved	X	against	our	stated	goal	of	Y’	–	as	a	government	-	which	would	be	far	more	valuable	to	readers	than	the	current	list	of	(presumably)	every	programme,	framework,	policy	and	intervention,	with	numbers	attached.	That	government	is	saving	money,	improving	internal	performance	and	running	a	tight	ship	is	clear	from	the	MTR;	but	what	is	less	clear,	is	what	do	all	the	externalities	add	up	to?	How	much	of	a	dent	are	we	making	in	poverty,	food	insecurity,	inequality,	racism,	township	economic	stagnation,	and	so	on?	Do	the	programmes	have	both	internal	and	transversal	logic?	If	not,	we	are	firing	good	intentions	at	problems.		27. Success	or	failure	is	impossible	to	deduce	from	a	list	–	it	requires	a	judgement;	and	to	judge	success	or	failure,	we	need	to	know	what	the	goal	was;	how	we	planned	to	reach	it;	what	got	in	our	way	(such	as	faulty	internal	assumptions,	or	external	shocks);	and	how	we	plan	to	get	back	on	track/speed	up	progress/etc.	Perhaps	this	is	unfair	–	but	the	multiple	frameworks,	programmes,	strategies,	task	teams	and	the	like	have	all,	been	at	work	converting	into	programmatic	intervention	the	promises	of	politicians,	summarised	at	the	outset:		Themed  on  creating  a  better  life  for  all  and  a  pledge  to  move  South  Africa forward  together,  the  electoral  mandate  directed  government  to  build  on  the successes  and  tackle  the  challenges  of  the  first  twenty  years  of  democracy since  1994.    The  imperative  was  to  carry  forward  the  progress  made  in implementing  the  2009  manifesto  priorities:  the  creation  of  more  jobs,  decent work and sustainable livelihoods for inclusive growth; rural development, land reform  and  food  security;  improving  education  and  health  systems  and outcomes; and fighting crime and corruption. The 2014 election mandate further prioritised and made a commitment to:  The  expansion  of  access  to  housing  and  basic  services  as  part  of  the commitment to build integrated and sustainable human settlements; Build  a  democratic  developmental  state  capable  of  mobilising  all  sectors  and boldly intervening in the economy in favour of workers and the poor; and  Working  with  all  sectors  of  society  to  create  conditions  for  the  promotion  of social cohesion and nation building and contribute to a better Africa and a just world.

7	In  giving  effect  to  the  electoral  mandate  and  the  National  Development  Plan (NDP), the Premier announced a comprehensive programme of radical socio-economic  transformation  for  the  Gauteng  City  Region – the  Ten  Pillar Programme  of  Transformation,  Modernisation  and  Reindustrialisation  (TMR).  The  TMR  programme  was  pronounced  in  the  Premier’s  first  State  of  the Province  Address  on  27  June  2014  and  consisted  of  the  following  ten strategic pillars: Radical economic transformation Decisive spatial transformation Accelerated social transformation Transformation of state and governance Modernisation of the public service Modernisation of the economy Modernisation of human settlements and urban development Modernisation of public transport infrastructure Reindustrialisation of Gauteng Province Taking the lead in Africa’s new industrial revolution.    28. This	preamble	suggests	that	the	reader	will	find	a	merging	of	the	NDP	with	the	10	pillars	of	the	Premier,	broken	down	into	measurable	actions,	those	transformed	into	programmes	of	size	allowed	by	the	fiscus,	located	in	departments	but	co-ordinated	by	the	planning	unit,	and	wherever	possible,	implemented	together.	If	we	want	‘Radical	economic	transformation’,	for	example,	do	we	believe	this	is	possible	without	simultaneously	pursuing	‘Accelerated	social	transformation’	–	not	in	parallel	but	in	the	design	of	programmes,	and	at	the	same	points	of	implementation?	A	skills	training	programme	that	does	not	embed	messages	about	equality,	anti-xenophobia,	anti-racism,	pro-gender	equality	and	the	like	is	going	to	do	absolutely	nothing	to	assist	with	these	‘wicked’	issues	that	continue	to	bedevil	the	province.	The	programme	will	produce	graduates	who	leave	with	some	skills	but	with	as	prejudiced	and/or	alienated	world	views	as	they	entered	the	programme.			29. The	danger	is	a	continual	focus	on	provision	of	basic	services	and	infrastructure,	in	the	hope	that	this	will	‘take	care’	of	more	complex	societal	challenges.	The	basis	of	the	1994	Reconstruction	and	Development	Programme	(RDP)	was	just	that:-	a	hope	that	if	basic	needs	were	met,	then	‘dignity’	(so	violently	wrenched	from	African,	coloured	and	Indian	people)	would	be	restored	–	with	no	clarity	(or	theory	of	change)	as	to	how	this	was	supposed	to	happen.	All	research	since	then	suggests	that	this	signally	fails	to	occur	(see	for	example	every	iteration	of	the	GCRO	‘Quality	of	Life’	survey).			30. Ignoring	all	the	global	post-1994	challenges	–	economic	crises,	wars	(on	terror	or	other),	and	so	on	–	if	we	focus	simply	on	domestic	matters,	we	have	yet	to	see	any	government	(in	any	sphere	or	from	any	party)	outline	a	genuine	post-apartheid	theory	of	change,	that	can	encompass	the	unquestioned	need	to	meet	basic	needs	and	to	deal	decisively	and	simultaneously	with	psycho-social	issues;	and,	crucially,	signal	what	might

8	be	taken	to	measure	‘normality’	–	the	end	of	transformation	and	transition	and	all	the	interim	language	that	marks	government	documents,	including	this	one.	If	we	can’t	measure	what	we’re	doing	and	why	we	are	doing	it;	we	then	do	not	know	what	all	the	small	actions	add	up	to;	and	we	will	not	be	able	to	see	above	the	concatenation	of	small	programme	reports	to	understand	progress	towards	the	attainment	of	a	democratic,	non-sexist	and	non-racial	South	Africa.			31. The	RDP	was	facing	massive	expectations	and	massive	inequalities.	It	had	to	pick	the	low-hanging	fruit,	and	in	Gauteng	this	has	been	massively	successful,	as	the	MTR	makes	clear.	But	this	current	Gauteng	administration	is	not	facing	the	bleak	landscape	of	1994.	The	opening	section	of	the	report	shows	how	successfully	‘development’	has	occurred	in	the	province.	As	such,	it	must	fall	to	Gauteng	to	insist	(to	itself)	that	integration	is	the	only	way	that	future	programmes	can	operate:	in	other	words,	not	to	wait	for	development	–	in	the	form	of	service	delivery	or	infrastructure	provision	-	to	‘happen’	before	worrying	about	psycho-social	issues,	but	integrating	positive	psycho-social	messages	and	‘soft’	programmes	within	the	‘bricks	and	mortar’	programmes	that	will	continue	to	roll	out.			32. Rape,	homophobia,	xenophobia,	racism,	violence,	criminality,	substance	abuse	–	these	and	other	psycho-social	challenges	can	be	integrated	within	job	creation	or	farming	extension	or	skills	training	or	other	programmes,	with	the	right	design	and	the	right	partnerships.	But	if	government	remains	mired	in	silos,	with	multiple	frameworks	and	programmes	running	out	of	different	departments,	without	an	integrating	mechanism	beyond	a	planning	department	that	sits	in	the	Office	of	the	Premier	while	programmes	report	to	MECs	–	we	shall	continue	with	bricks	and	mortar	programmes,	but	remain	surprised	when	those	bricks	are	thrown	at	police	during	protests	by	residents	whose	psychological	needs	remain	unmet.		Governmentality 33. But	rather	like	the	silence	regarding	action	against	xenophobia,	the	silence	regarding	GPG’s	theory	of	change	is	of	concern.	Seen	from	a	governance	perspective,	the	questions	is	–	do	you	know	where	you	are	on	the	journey	to	where	you	are	going?	The	obvious	danger	facing	GPG	–	from	a	cynical	reading	of	this	MTR	–	is	that	government	is	doing	what	it	does	best,	namely	allowing	a	proliferation	of	internal	activities	at	the	expense	of	the	populace	–	the	exact	opposite	of	what	an	‘activist	government’	would	want	to	occur.			34. But	the	reader	of	this	document	is	drowned	in	acronyms,	programmes,	frameworks,	policies,	committees	and	so	on,	most	of	which	would	have	included	a	panel	of	experts,	consultants,	policy	advisors,	M&E	experts,	financial	planners	and	the	like	–	and	the	cartoon	from	the	New	Yorker	elegantly	captures	the	feelings	of	most	citizens	onwards	such	activities,	and	the	costs	associated	with	them.

9			35. In	addition,	from	a	governance	perspective,	a	legitimate	question	is:	when,	if	at	all,	were	residents	treated	as	insiders,	and	asked	to	reflect	on	the	value	and	costs	associated	with	GPG’s	multifarious	programmes?	Governance	is	about	the	location	of	power	in	society,	and	the	accountability	of	those	who	can	wield	power.	Does	GPG	have	the	appropriate	apparatus	to	reach	out	to	citizens	and	allow	a	meaningful	engagement	–	we	know	that	IDP	and	similar	fora	are	not	attracting	residents,	and	those	who	do	attend	seem	to	have	very	low	expectations	of	being	heard.	But	in	a	democracy,	voice	is	important	–	so	an	outsider’s	question	is,	at	what	point	did	the	voice	of	Gauteng	residents	get	heard	(post	election	day),	and	with	what	effect?		Can an activist government cope with an activist citizenry?		36. As	we	approach	the	conclusion,	it	is	important	to	highlight	in	this	report	what	is	not	highlighted	in	the	MTR,	but	which	provides	continual	‘background	noise’	–	namely,	the	distance	between	the	‘activist	government’	and	the	governed.	‘Protest’	is	mentioned	ten	times	in	the	report,	along	with	positive	mentions	of	a	‘war	room’	to	try	and	deal	with	it,	but	also	an	ominous	look	at	the	rise	in	scale	and	violence:		The period 2012 to 2016 has then seen an escalation in the both the number and  scale  of  protests,  peaking  at  40  protests  in  2014, before  subsiding  to  25 in  2015,  but  increasing  again  to  24  in  the  period  to  July  2016.  Particularly concerning is the increasingly violent nature of the protests

10	37. The	report	nods	in	the	direction	of	engaging	citizens,	though	unfortunately	cloaked	in	the	language	of	‘war	rooms’	and	the	like,	perhaps	an	inappropriate	appellation	for	an	office	dealing	with	violent	protest:		… this  programme  outcome  seeks  to  enhance  the  GPG  as  an  activist government,  and  to  institutionalise  rapid  response  to  community  concerns and  proactive  engagement  with  communities  at  all  levels.  This  will  be achieved  through  mainstreaming  the  Ntirhisano  Service  Delivery  Rapid Response  System,  the  hotlines  and  the  Service  Delivery  War  Room,  and integrating  the  work  of  Community  Development  Worker’s,  thus  curtailing  the escalation of community concerns into violent protests.  38. Rather	late	than	never	–	we	have	been	witnesses	to	xenophobic	violence,	for	example,	for	almost	a	decade;	and	to	more	generalised	violence	for	a	lot	longer,	but	the	text	is	written	in	the	future	tense,	of	an	intention	rather	than	an	already	completed	action.	Why	such	a	‘war	room’	(which	aims	at	bringing	about	peace….)	was	not	created	on	day	one	is	a	not	unreasonable	question.	But	there	is	a	deeper	issue	at	stake.		39. Gauteng	has	become	a	centre	for	civic	protest.	We	know	the	label	‘service	delivery	protest’	obscures	more	than	it	reveals,	and	there	are	competing	political,	criminal	and	civic	interests	at	play.	Nonetheless,	protest	is	the	sign	of	an	engaged	citizenry,	one	that	has	learned	that	“protest	is	the	quickest	petition”	(Everatt,	Marais,	Dube:	‘Participation	–	for	what	purpose?’	in	Politikon).	Is	a	‘war’	room	the	appropriate	response	–	even	the	language	implies	a	taking	of	sides,	an	oppositionality,	where	in	fact	we	are	witnessing	activist	government	meeting	activist	communities.	How	government	manages	protest	will	be	a	key	litmus	test	of	its	commitment	to	being	activist.	And	allowing	voice	to	those	who	feel	side-lined	or	ignored	will	be	key	in	doing	so.		40. A	key	issue	GPG	needs	to	look	at	is	that	of	participatory	governance.	The	globally	well-known	sub-national	level	examples	–	such	as	Porto	Allegre	or	Kerala	–	are	based	on	government	releasing	the	levers	of	power	sufficiently	for	local	residents	to	determine	the	ranking	of	issues	to	be	tackled,	and	the	budgetary	proportions	to	be	set	against	each	key	area.	The	basic	idea	is	that	residents	should	play	a	more	direct	role	in	decision-making	and	government	officials	should	be	confident	enough	to	allow	and	respond	to	this	kind	of	engagement.	Izimbizo	were	a	weak	attempt	to	follow	suit,	but	would	often	result	in	promises	made	to	those	who	attended	–	a	school	here,	a	road	there	–	but	these	would	cause	envy	amongst	residents	who	had	not	been	heard,	or	not	attended.	The	public	service,	naturally	risk	averse,	has	become	even	more	so	over	time.	Access	to	power	is	more	distant,	for	citizens,	than	it	has	ever	been.	 Conclusion 41. It	seems	apparent	that	if	Gauteng	is	to	break	the	bitter	cycle	of	successful	delivery	of	infrastructure	of	services	being	met	with	rising	levels	of	protest,	xenophobia	and	crime,	it	needs	a	machinery	of	engagement.	It

11	needs	to	be	an	activist	government	that	embraces	other	activists,	that	can	listen	and	ensure	they	have	voice,	that	it	is	nimble	and	can	change	in	mid-programme	if	it	seems	to	be	going	awry	–	because	it	knows	what	each	programme	contributes	to	the	theory	of	change.	Above	all,	GPG	needs	to	loosen	the	constraints	on	and	concentration	of	power.	If	GPG	trusts	the	residents	it	governs,	it	needs	to	find	ways	of	allowing	our	voices	to	influence	how	GPG	plans,	executes	and	measures	its	work,	and	how	it	reports	to	us.		42. For	this	to	work	efficiently,	as	argued	above,	government	needs	to	know	what	it	is	trying	to	do	before	it	leaps	into	the	fray.	There	is	a	completely	understandable	desire	for	‘quick	wins’,	for	increasingly	dubious	voters	to	be	shown	that	government	can	work	for	them.	However,	diving	into	‘deliverology’	without	an	adequately	developed	theory	of	change	will	mean	more	of	the	same	–	and	that	will	not	suffice.	A	mid-term	report-back	–	to	residents	–	needs	to	tell	us	what	GPG	is	trying	to	do;	how	it	is	trying	to	do	so;	via	which,	interrelated	vehicles	(frameworks,	programmes,	etc.);	and	with	what	results.	Merely	listing	numbers	of	participants	does	not	tell	us	anything	of	substance.	Listing	frameworks	and	strategies	makes	us	anxious	that	government	is	feeding	the	machinery	of	government	–	all	the	consultants,	advisors	and	other	hangers	on	–	but	is	a	closed	door	when	it	comes	to	residents’	attempts	to	give	voice	to	their	own	needs	and	desires.		43. This	is	an	easy	criticism	to	make,	and	one	that	can	be	levelled	against	most	governments	at	most	times.	But	for	a	self-proclaimed	‘activist	government’	it	is	inappropriate.	GPG	needs	to	find	a	way	to	close	the	gap	between	government	and	governed.	It	is	in	a	strong	position,	as	the	opening,	descriptive	section	of	the	report	makes	clear	–	it	has	done	more	than	any	other	provincial	government	to	make	good	on	the	promises	of	the	RDP.		44. However,	where	the	NDP	talks	of	‘the	active	citizen’,	GPG	seems	not	to	have	a	clear	strategy	for	engagement,	for	listening,	and	for	trusting	–	for	releasing	some	of	its	grip	on	power	and	allowing	residents	to	influence	priorities,	programmes	and	budgets.	Until	we	take	this	step,	residents	will	see	themselves	on	one	‘side’	with	government	on	the	other;	governance	will	be	the	victim.

12	Sample list of strategies cited in MTR 1. the Accelerated Social Transformation Strategy  2. the Governance and Planning Roadmap 3. a GCR-wide human resources development strategy 4. the Agro-Processing Strategy, 5. the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Plan (GFIP) strategy, 6. the Gauteng Township Economy Revitalisation (TER) Strategy  7. The Gauteng Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (GIBUS) 8. The Gauteng Resourcing Strategy 9. The Gauteng Procurement Strategy 10. the  Gauteng  Integrated  Energy  Strategy  (GIES,  2010)  has  renamed  “the Gauteng Energy Security Strategy (GESS)” 11. the Gauteng Tourism Sector Strategy 12. the Mineral Beneficiation Sector Strategy 13. the Gauteng Aquaculture strategy 14. the Agro-Processing Strategy 15. the Provincial Transport Strategy 16. the Gauteng Trade and Investment Strategy  17. the GCR International Relations Strategy  18. The Gauteng Trade and Investment Strategy  19. the GCR International Relations Strategy  20. GDE E-learning strategy 21. the Gauteng Safety Strategy 22. Agritropolis strategy 23. Government Debt strategy 24. Gauteng Resourcing Strategy 25. Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework 26. the Gauteng Anti-Corruption and Integrity Management Strategy 27. a climate-smart agriculture strategy 28. the Gauteng Agriculture and Agro-processing Strategy 29. the societal behaviour change strategy 30. the provincial social cohesion strategy 31. the Gauteng Climate Change Strategy (GCCRS) and Action Plan 32. a Gauteng City-Region Climate Change Response Overarching Strategy 33. the GCR-wide Disaster Management Strategy 34. the Township Economic Revitalisation Strategy 35. the Accelerated Social Transformation Strategy

13	Sample list of frameworks cited in MTR 1. The Township Stock Exchange (TSE) framework 2. The Township Solidarity / Partnership Fund framework 3. the GCR Job Creation Framework / Plan 4. the legal framework agreement for Solar PV 5. for the GCR Incentives Framework  6. the draft Gauteng Incentives Framework 7. The GCR Infrastructure Master Plan,  8. the Gauteng Spatial Development Framework 9. the SPLUMA implementation Plan 10. Gauteng  Environmental  Management  Framework  (EMF)  approved,  as  well as the Gauteng Green House Gas Inventory (GHG) developed. 11. The Gauteng Environmental Management Framework 12. Gauteng Environmental Management Framework (EMF) 13. the Gauteng Green House Gas Inventory (GHG). 14. the Vaal River City Implementation Framework 15. the Regional Spatial Development Framework for Lanseria node 16. The draft IGR policy framework 17. the revised Gauteng Anti-Corruption Strategic Framework 18. the Integrity Management Framework 19. an improved Disclosure Framework 20. a Contract Management Framework 21. the  gender,  youth,  disability,  military  veterans  and  older  persons (GEYODI&MVO) policy framework  22. the Land Invasion Framework 23. a coherent GCR governance and institutional framework 24. the Theory of Change and Results Chain Framework 25. the Gauteng IDP Analysis Framework

14	Sample list of programmes cited in MTR Through 2014/15 as a transition year, focus was placed on the development of new sectoral policies, as well as the translation of the TMR into measurable programmes and targets to enable higher order results and transformative impacts.   1. the Ntirhisano Service Delivery War Room and Outreach Programme 2. a  comprehensive  programme  of  radical  socio-economic  transformation  for the  Gauteng  City  Region – the  Ten Pillar  Programme  of  Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation (TMR). 3. the antiretroviral treatment programme 4. the Gauteng Frontline Service Delivery Monitoring (FSDM) programme 5. the Transformation, Modernisation and Reindustrialisation programme.   6. the War on Poverty Programme 7. the Welfare to Work Programme 8. Game Changer programme (never defined) 9. tourism skills development programmes. 10. the Tshepo 500 000 Programme  11. EPWP programmes 12. the TIH Fablab programme 13. youth education programmes at the Constitution Hill 14. ECD massification programme 15. the comprehensive school nutrition programme 16. The Bana-Pele programme 17. food production programme 18. a variety of skills development programmes 19. The Ke Moja Drug Prevention Programme 20. the Ntirhisano Community Outreach Programme 21. The Township Economy Revitalisation Programme 22. the Professional Development Programme 23. the tourism market access programme 24. The Responsible Tourism pilot programme 25. the Gauteng Accelerator Programme 26. the  Maxum incubation programme 27. the jewellery making programme 28. DRT’s contractor development programme 29. the National Youth Service (NYS) Programme 30. the Zivuseni Reloaded Programme 31. the market access programme 32. the Letsema programme 33. the veterinary and livestock production mentoring programme  34. the eKasi Labs Programme 35. the PRASA Corridor Modernisation Programme 36. The Shova Kalula programme, as a subset of the NMT project (3000 bicycles) 37. the  export  promotion  programme/the  Africa  focussed  market  access programme 38. the school twinning programme 39. the Schools of Specialisation programme 40. programmes on TB screening 41. the Healthy Wednesdays programme 42. The WBOT programme 43. homestead food gardens programmes 44. a skills training programme 45. The Take Charge outreach programme 46. youth safety promotion programmes 47. the  integrated  substance  abuse  prevention,  treatment  and  rehabilitation model 48. the Ke-Moja Drug Prevention programme

15	49. the Mega Projects programme/ the Mega Human Settlements programme 50. Back to Basics (B2B) Programme 51. the Kliptown and Alexandra urban revitalisation programmes 52. revenue enhancement programme 53. the Integrity Management Framework and programme 54. the eradication of poverty and urban hunger programme 55. the infrastructure development and maintenance programme 56. the Social Movement Programme 57. the CRU Programme 58. the urban regeneration programme